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I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have developed an arsenal of theories to ensure that settled claims
and issues remain conclusively resolved.I Such theories include: res judicata,
stare decisis, and collateral estoppel. The American system of courts is set up
to provide for the just resolution of disputes.2 Arbitration also provides for
the just resolution of disputes, and in a study undertaken by the Bureau of
National Affairs, ninety-nine percent of all collective bargaining agreements
were found to have provisions requiring arbitration of disputes. 3 In
International Union v. Dana Corp.,4 Dana Corporation ("Dana") attempted
to convince the Sixth Circuit that the abovementioned theories should apply
to arbitrations arising out of their collective bargaining agreement with the
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America ("UAW"). 5
In Dana Corp., the Sixth Circuit rejected Dana's argument and left the
question of precedential effect to the arbitrator.6 The court would not provide
Dana relief from the unambiguous language of its written agreement with the
UAW. 7 This case represents the struggle between the important value of
finality8 and the contractual nature of arbitration. 9 In the end, though, the
contractual nature of arbitration reigns supreme. The Supreme Court has
continually restated the expansive degree of deference that arbitrators are
given.' 0 The application of precedential effect to a prior arbitration belongs
* Int'l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002).
Timothy J. Heinsz, Grieve it Again: Of Stare Decisis, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Labor Arbitration, 38 B.C. L. REV. 275, 275 (1997).
2 Id.
3 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 37 (14th ed.
1995).
4 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 555.
5 See id.
6 Id. at 557.
7 Id. at 557-58.
8 Heinsz, supra note 1.
9 See infra text accompanying note 90.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 43, 87-88.
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in the hands of the arbitrator, and the Sixth Circuit acknowledged this and
decided Dana Corp. correctly.'1
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The UAW and Dana were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
("Master Agreement") that covered several of Dana's plants. 12 The Master
Agreement, most recently renegotiated in 1998,13 contained provisions
regarding the arbitration of grievances, and the selection of a permanent
arbitrator ("Arbitrator") by agreement. 14 Further, the Agreement stated that
all decisions of the Arbitrator "shall be final and binding upon both the
Union and the Company."' 15 Dana's behavior at its unorganized plants when
the UAW sought to represent the employees was governed by a side letter
("Neutrality Letter") to the Master Agreement. 16 In the Neutrality Letter,
Dana and the UAW agreed to a provision that required all disputes involving
neutrality to be submitted to final and binding arbitration. 17
I1 See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
12 Int'l Union v. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d 548, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2002).
13 Id. at 551 n.1.
14 Id. at 551. The Master Agreement governed how the arbitrator was to make
decisions and provided:
In deciding a case, it shall be the function of the Arbitrator to interpret the
Agreement and all Supplemental Agreements thereto and to decide whether or not
there has been a violation thereof. He shall have no right to change, add to, subtract
from, or modify any of the terms of this Agreement or any Supplemental
Agreements thereto ....
Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. The letter provides:
Where the UAW becomes involved in matters relating to the representation of our
employees, we intend to continue our commitment of maintaining a neutral position
on this matter. The Company and/or its representatives will communicate with our
employees, not in an anti-UAW manner, but in a positive pro-Dana manner.
Id. Dana stated that it had no objections to the UAW becoming or remaining the
bargaining representative as a result of an election. Id. However, Dana reserved the right
to "speak out in any manner appropriate when undue provocation is evident in a
representation campaign." Id.
17 Id. at 551 n.3. The parties would not resort to legal action unless one party did not
abide by the Arbitrator's decision and the Arbitrator concluded as such. Id.
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Permanent Arbitrator Richard Mittenthal interpreted the neutrality letter
in arbitration awards in 1981, 1994, and two in 1997.18 In his opinion for the
1981 arbitration, he recognized that Dana and the UAW had not agreed to a
stance of "strict neutrality," whereby Dana would have been prohibited from
taking any stance with respect to union organization. 19 Rather, Arbitrator
Mittenthal found that the parties had agreed that Dana's opposition, if any, to
a UAW organizing campaign could not be couched in anti-UAW language.20
He recognized that "at first blush" there appears to be a possible
contradiction and explained that "what the parties appear to have in mind is
that Dana argue its case in an objective high-minded fashion
without... threats and innuendos." 21 In Arbitrator Mittenthal's 1994
arbitration opinion, he expanded on what he meant by "anti-UAW" by
stating that it shall mean "any anti-UAW statements-truthful or
untruthful. '22 In the 1997 arbitrations, Arbitrator Mittenthal reiterated his
1981 and 1994 interpretations of the neutrality provision.23
The UAW attempted to organize the Dana Plant in Greensboro, North
Carolina in 1998, and on September 4, 1998, the UAW filed a grievance with
Paul E. Glendon, the new permanent arbitrator. 24 Arbitrator Glendon, in his
arbitration opinion, discussed the history of the neutrality provision and
recognized that Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation "had been a part of the
parties' collective bargaining relationship for seventeen years" and that
"questions of whether the Corporation violated the Neutrality Letter at
Greensboro... must be answered with this arbitral history in mind. '25 The
interpretation of the neutrality provision by Arbitrator Mittenthal was
expressly invoked for three out of the five charges that Arbitrator Glendon
had sustained. 26
18 Id. at 551.
19 Id. at 551-52.
20 Id. at 552.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. The UAW charged Dana with twelve violations of the neutrality letter. Id.
Arbitrator Glendon ultimately issued an award for the UAW on five of the charges. Id.
25 Id. (quoting Joint Appendix (hereinafter "J.A.") at 149 (1999 Arbitration)).
26 Id. The first charge involved a communication of Dana where it had linked union
representation with job loss, and Arbitrator Mittenthal had stated in his 1997 arbitration
opinion that such a linkage was anti-UAW and "can hardly be viewed as a
communication ... in a positive pro-Dana manner." Id. at 552-53 (quoting J.A. at 151
(1999 Arbitration) (quoting Feb. 13, 1997 arbitration, J.A. at 127) (alteration in original)).
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Arbitrator Glendon rejected Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation for the
sixth and twelfth charges. 27 The sixth charge involved a letter sent by a plant
manager to the Dana employees stating that Dana was absolutely opposed to
unionization at the plant and described the negative results for employees. 28
Arbitrator Glendon recognized that the letter was not explicitly anti-UAW,
and it might have even passed muster under Arbitrator Mittenthal's
interpretation. 29 However, he stated that "it is not only difficult, but
impossible, to reconcile such statements with the 'no objection' pledge in
particular and the commitment of neutrality in general. '30 Similar to
Arbitrator Mittenthal, Arbitrator Glendon stated that:
[Dana was] not sentenced to silence in a UAW organizing campaign, but
what the Neutrality Letter permits by way of pro-Dana communication is, at
most, a statement by management to employees at a plant facing an
organizational campaign that Dana has no objection to the UAW
representing them but wishes to remind them of the benefits they already
enjoy without such representation. 3 1
With respect to the twelfth charge, Arbitrator Glendon found Dana
violated the Neutrality Letter in its "strident" opposition to the UAW
representational campaign which "effected the constructive discharge of
employee Crystal Windsor." 32
The UAW filed a claim in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act33
The second and third charges were sustained because Dana had made explicit anti-UAW
statements to its employees. Id. at 553.
27 Id.
28 Id. The letter used scare tactics such as "unions... want to lock companies up
into restrictive contracts" and "[unionization] will be like giving others a blank check to
make decisions about your future." Id. at 553 n.4.
29 Id. at 553; supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Arbitrator Glendon never explained which interpretation of the neutrality
provision he used on the twelfth charge, his or Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation. Id.
As the Sixth Circuit explained, "[I]t is possible that Arbitrator Mittenthal would not have
come to the same conclusion." Id.
33 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000). The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") is
located at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000). The NLRA was originally enacted in 1935 and is
referred to as the Wagner Act. The most important amendments are the Labor-
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (2000), and the
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to enforce Arbitrator Glendon's award.34 Dana responded by filing a
counterclaim to vacate the award, and the cases were consolidated in the
district court.35 The UAW moved for summary judgment, and then Dana
filed a cross motion for summary judgment, whereby Dana argued that
because "Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation of the neutrality provision
diverged from Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation of the provision,
Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation of the provision failed to draw its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement and violated public policy."36
The district court concluded that prior arbitration opinions do not bind
later arbitrations unless the collective bargaining agreement so states.37
Moreover, the court found that Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation of the
neutrality letter "drew its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. '38 The UAW's motion for summary judgment was granted and
Dana's cross motion was denied-whereby Dana appealed.39 The judge from
the district court stated that "[a]lthough the issue is not entirely resolved in
the case law, I conclude that the best approach is to refrain, as a general rule,
from requiring an arbitrator to give res judicata, collateral estoppel, or other
preclusive effect to decisions in earlier arbitrations. ' 40
III. SIXTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit stated that the scope of review of a district court's
grant of summary judgment in an arbitrated labor dispute is "extremely
limited. '41 The United States Supreme Court described this scope of review
by stating: "As long as the arbitrator's award draws its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement, and is not merely his own brand of
industrial justice, the award is legitimate. '42 An arbitrator need only be
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffen) Act of 1959 (codified
as amended in sections throughout 29 U.S.C.).
34 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 553.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 553-54.
37 Id. at 554.
38 Id.
3 9 Id.
40 Id. at 555 (citing Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment).
41 Id. at 554 (citing Beacon Journal Publ'g Co. v. Akron Newspaper Guild, Local
No. 7, 114 F.3d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1997)).
42 Id. (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
(quotation marks omitted)); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
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"arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of
his authority" for a court to sustain the arbitrator's decision, even though the
court may be "convinced he committed serious error."'43 Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit has developed a four-prong test for determining when an
arbitration award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. 44 An arbitration award fails when:
(1) [I]t conflicts with express terms of the agreement; (2) it imposes
additional requirements not expressly provided for in the agreement; (3) it is
not rationally supported by or derived from the agreement; or (4) it is based
on general considerations of fairness and equity instead of the exact terms
of the agreement. 45
The Sixth Circuit concluded that it was within the scope of Arbitrator
Glendon's authority to diverge from Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation of
the neutrality provision and held that the award drew its essence from the
Master Agreement. 46 Further, the court rejected Dana's argument that
Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation violates federal labor policy.4 7
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Preclusive Effect of Prior Arbitrations
The court acknowledged that there are three ways to treat prior
arbitrations.4 8 The Eighth Circuit stated that "the doctrine of res j udicata may
apply to arbitrations with strict factual identities."49 A second way to treat
prior arbitration decisions is the Fifth Circuit's "material factual identity test
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (holding an "award is legitimate only so long as it draws
its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award").
43 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 554 (citing Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v.
Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (quotation marks omitted in original)).
44 Id.
45 Id. (citing MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Prof I Employees Div., of Local
79, 183 F.3d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted in original)).
46 Id. at 557-58.
47 Id. at 558.
48 Id. at 554-58.
49 Id. at 555 (citing Trailways Lines Inc. v. Trailways, Inc. Joint Council, 807 F.2d
1416, 1425 (8th Cir. 1986)).
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to determine if a prior arbitration award governed the conduct of parties to a
collective bargaining agreement. '50 Lastly, the majority of other circuits have
held that there is no preclusive effect "unless the collective bargaining
agreement so stipulates." 51 Circuits holding this majority view also have said
that without contractual language to the contrary, the preclusive effect of an
earlier arbitration award is to be determined by the arbitrator. 52
Courts that have used the "strict factual identity" test have required the
facts to be so nearly identical that the employer's failure to adhere to the
earlier arbitration awards constitutes willful and persistent disregard of the
earlier awards. 53 While the Eighth Circuit's decision in Trailways that laid
out the "strict identity test" appears to still be good law in that jurisdiction,
the Eighth Circuit acknowledged approximately ten years after Trailways
was decided that an arbitrator's award can be reversed because it does not
draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, not only because
it ignored a prior award. 54 The "material factual identity test" of the Fifth
Circuit also appears to be good law and is met when there is no difference
50 /d. (citing Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local No. 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d
1044, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981)).
51 Id. at 555, 556 n.7
In UA W Local Union No. 463 v. Weatherhead Co., the Sixth Circuit affirmed
without comment a district court opinion that held "an arbitrator's decision on a question
of interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude rearbitration of
that question, even though arbitration was contractually stipulated to be 'final and
binding."' Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 556 n.7 (citing UAW Local Union No. 463 v.
Weatherhead Co., 316 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1963) (quotation omitted)). The district court
noted that "the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel may apply to an
arbitrator's decision, [but] they are not applicable here." Id. (citing UAW Local Union
No. 463 v. Weatherhead Co., 203 F.Supp. 612, 619 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (quotation marks
omitted)). The Dana Court found the district court case of little import, particularly
because it was decided before Misco. Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 555 n.7; see supra note 42
and accompanying text.
52 Id. at 556, 556 n.8; see, e.g., Bd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Burlington N.
R.R. Co., 24 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1994); Hotel Ass'n of Washington D.C., Inc. v.
Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, Local 25, 963 F.2d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Gen.
Comm. of Adjustment, United Transp. Union v. CSX R.R. Corp., 893 F.2d 584, 593 n.10
(3rd Cir. 1990); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. II, 702 F.2d 273,
280 (1st Cir. 1983); Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Local 420, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers,
718 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2nd Cir. 1983).
53 United Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers of Am. v. Honeywell Inc., 522 F.2d 1221,
1227 (7th Cir. 1975).
54 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 555 n.6 (citing Am. Nat'l Can. Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 120 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir. 1997)).
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between the facts of the current and former disputes which would justify an
arbitrator reaching a different conclusion in each of them based on the same
collective bargaining agreement.55 The Fifth Circuit distinguished material
factual identity from strict factual identity by stating that "the term strict
factual identity so completely defies being operationally defined as to be
devoid of meaning." 56 Further, it noted that there can never be a truly strict
factual identity,57 but on the other hand, use of materiality can be logically
and instrumentally defined.58
Dana relied on the Supreme Court case, Metropolitan Edison v. NLRB, 59
which stated the following in a footnote: "[w]here there is a clear and
consistent pattern of arbitration decisions the parties, in some circumstances,
may be said to have incorporated the decisions into their subsequent
bargaining agreements." 60 Yet, Dana's reliance on Metropolitan Edison was
misguided, because such an incorporation, if any, is up to the arbitrator to
decide-not the court.61
The Sixth Circuit rejected the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' approaches and
joined the majority of other circuits that have decided this issue by holding
that "the preclusive effect of an earlier arbitration award is to be determined
by the arbitrator. '62 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit also rejected Dana's
argument that the Master Agreement's requirement of "final and binding"
arbitration "mandates prospective application of standards developed in
arbitration." 63 The Sixth Circuit relied on a D.C. Circuit opinion, where the
appellant made the same argument as Dana.64 According to the Dana Court,
in Hotel Ass 'n of Washington D.C., Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 25,
the D.C. Circuit had held:
55 Oil Workers Int ' Union, 644 F.2d at 1055.
56 Id. at 1054 (quotation marks omitted).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1055.
59 Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983).
60 Id. at 709 n.l 3.
61 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 556 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l
Union of Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 765 (1983)) (holding that "because the
authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining .... the scope of the
arbitrator's authority is itself a question of contract interpretation that the parties have
delegated to the arbitrator") (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 557.
63 Id. at 555.
64 Hotel Ass'n of Washington D.C., Inc. v. Hotel & Rest. Employees Union, 963
F.2d 388, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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[T]he "final and binding" clause of the collective bargaining agreement only
required that an arbitrator not reopen an earlier arbitration decision; the
clause "does not so unequivocally import the principle of precedent into
arbitral decision making that [the arbitrator] was obliged expressly to
consider it lest his decision fail to draw its essence from the contract."
6 5
The Sixth Circuit expressed that arbitrators should consider prior
arbitrations involving the same provisions of the collective bargaining
agreements. 66 In contrast, other circuit courts have treated the prior
arbitrations as irrelevant; in fact, they left the decision of precedential effect
up to the arbitrator. 67 Consider the Second Circuit, which in Connecticut
Light & Power v. Local 420 stated that subsequent arbitrators usually treat
prior awards as "final and binding," but if "awards are inconsistent and a
'need for resolving conflict is evident,' the federal court should 'select that
interpretation which most clearly conforms to the intent of the parties.' 6 8
Arbitrator Glendon addressed Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation of
the neutrality provision and only departed from it when a situation arose that
Arbitrator Glendon found created an impossibility for reconciliation with
Arbitrator Mittenthal's interpretation. 69 The court concluded that Arbitrator
Glendon's award was a "reasonable construction" and "[drew] its essence
from the Master Agreement."'70 In what seems like a recommendation to
Dana, the Sixth Circuit noted the harsh language of the D.C. Circuit:
[I]f the Employer is unhappy with the present [collective bargaining
agreement] it can bargain over changing it-to make provision for a system
of precedent, or to use a single arbitrator, or otherwise. It may not expect
65 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 556 (citing Hotel Ass 'n, 963 F.2d at 390). The Sixth
Circuit also pointed to UA WLocal Union No. 463 v. Weatherhead Co., a case which held
"that the 'final and binding' clause of the collective bargaining agreement made
arbitration decisions 'final and binding' on the parties only in regards to that decision."
Id. (citing UAW Local Union No. 463 v. Weatherhead Co., 203 F.Supp. 612, 619 (N.D.
Ohio 1962)).
66 Id. at 557.
67 Id. at 556, 556 n.8 (citing all of the cases in note 52).
68 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 556 n.8 (citing Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Local 420,
Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 718 F.2d 14, 21 (2nd Cir. 1983)).
69 See id. at 557; supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
70 Id. at 557-58. Arbitrator Glendon's award did not meet any prong of the test for
determining if an award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 45.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
this court, however, to serve as the deus ex machina that delivers it from the
consequences of the present agreement. 7
1
B. Neutrality Agreements
Dana also argued that Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation violated public
policy, specifically federal labor policy.72 The court began by pointing out
that an arbitration award would only be overturned under the public policy
exception in very limited circumstances. 73 To do so, "the court must
determine whether the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract jeopardizes a
well-defined and dominant public policy, taking the facts as found by the
arbitrator."74
Dana correctly noted that Section 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c),
permits the expression of views by an employer during an organizational
campaign, absent a threat of reprisal or promise of benefit, without such
statement constituting evidence of an unfair labor practice. 75 Yet,
Section 8(c) was irrelevant for the circumstances. First, neutrality arguments
are enforceable by federal courts. 76 Second, federal labor policy promotes
collective bargaining agreements, which cover the entire employment
relationship, creating a "new common law-the common law of a particular
industry or of a particular plant."'77 Both Dana and the UAW made an
agreement governing their employment relationship, and an arbitrator
71 Id. at 557 (citing Hotel Ass'n, of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. Hotel Rest. Employees
Union, Local 25 963 F.2d 388, 391(D.C. Cir. 1992)).
72 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
73 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 558 (citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. UMW, District
17, 531 U.S. 57, 63 (2000)).
74 Id. (citing MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr.-Clare v. Prof I Employees Div. of Local
79, 183 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 1999)).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 558-59 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 163 F.3d 403, 406
(6th Cir. 1998); Hotel & Rest. Employees Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996
F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1993); Hotel Employees Union Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961
F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992); Charles I. Cohen, Neutrality Agreements: Will the NLRB
Sanction Its Own Obsolescence?, 16 LAB. LAW. 201, 204 (2000); George N. Davies,
Neutrality Agreements: Basic Principles of Enforcement and Available Remedies, 16
LAB. LAW. 215, 216 (2000)).
77 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579
(1960).
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interpreted the neutrality provision in a linguistically permissible manner. 78
Dana voluntarily limited its own speech abilities, and hindsight taught it that
that might have been a bad idea.79 Nevertheless, a linguistically permissible
interpretation of a contractual provision hardly violates a policy that
encourages collectively bargained agreements. 80 Dana must heed the words
of the D.C. Circuit. 81
Lastly, Dana argued that it was the solemn protector of employees' rights
by arguing that Arbitrator Glendon's interpretation "effect[ed] a waiver of its
employees' statutorily protected rights to organize or refrain from organizing
under [Section] 7 of the NLRA. ' 82 However, the court responded by noting
that Section 7 rights are granted to employees, and it is unclear how a
limitation on Dana affects these rights.83 Also, the employees themselves
must assert the claim, because a "prudential [requirement] of Article III
standing is that 'a plaintiff ... cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal
rights or interests of third parties."' 84
78 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 557-58.
79 Id. at 558.
80 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581.
81 See supra text accompanying note 71.
82 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 559 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 157).
83 Id.
84 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)). There are exceptions to
this rule and where the litigant and the third party's rights are "inextricably bound up"
and the third party is not able to assert their rights, the Sixth Circuit has permitted the
litigant to assert the third party's rights for them. Id. at 559 n.13 (citing Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1394 (6th Cir. 1987)). But see
Viceroy Gold Corp. v. Aubry, 75 F.3d 482, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that an
employer does not have standing to assert the rights of their employees because the
employees could assert their rights themselves).
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V. Is DANA CORP. THE RIGHT WAY?
The Sixth Circuit never explained why it rejected the strict or material
factual identity tests-it merely adopted the majority approach. 85 The court
did state, however, that the case before it would have likely failed either of
those tests, because all of the arbitrations over the neutrality provision
involved different conduct at different organizing campaigns. 86 Also, the
court never explained why the majority approach is actually the better
approach. However, the court never needed to.
In Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n v. Garvey, the United States
Supreme Court recently demonstrated how narrow the class of cases is which
will permit a judicial overturning of an arbitration decision when it would not
even permit serious.error on the part of the arbitrator to be a sufficient reason
to reverse the arbitrator's decision. 87 Even serious error is not enough if the
arbitrator "arguably constru[es] or appl[ies] the contract and act[s] within the
scope of his authority. ' 88 Thus, Dana and other cases which are concerned
with the precedential effect of prior arbitrations are really about the power of
an arbitrator-specifically, the power of a labor arbitrator. In Misco, the
Supreme Court stated that an arbitration award must draw its essence from
the collective bargaining agreement. 89 The Supreme Court did not say that
the award must draw its essence from the bargaining history or history of
grievances; therefore, why should we be inclined to read such language into
Misco or Garvey?
A collective bargaining agreement is a contract,90 as was the Neutrality
Letter. As such, both Dana and the UAW bound themselves to the very
words, which derived from their collective bargaining. Arbitrator Glendon
examined the events surrounding the grievances and applied them to the
contracts governing Dana and the UAW's employment relationship. 91 The
85 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 557.
86 Id. at 557 n.9.
87 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001); see
also supra text accompanying note 43.
88 Id.
89 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)
90 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578-79 (1960) (citing Dean Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004-05 (1955)).
91 Dana Corp., 278 F.3d at 550-54.
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Supreme Court "exalted the role of the arbitrator as a force for industrial
peace, articulat[ing] a view of the labor contract as a working arrangement
between labor and management engrossing unwritten understandings and
plant practices ... and announced a doctrine of judicial self-restraint. '92
Apparently, much to Dana's chagrin, the Sixth Circuit maintains the doctrine
of judicial self-restraint and Misco still governs the standard for reviewing
arbitrations.
VI. CONCLUSION
Stare decisis, res judicata, and collateral estoppel all serve important
functions with respect to judicial economy. 93 Yet, the United States Supreme
Court has granted much more freedom to arbitrators in fashioning the awards
they may give. Arbitrators in labor arbitrations have the collective bargaining
agreement-a custom made private law, essentially a private constitution for
resolving grievances.94 Parties must decide in advance how the arbitrator's
decisions will be limited and whether doctrines such as res judicata and stare
decisis should apply, because the arbitrator is only as powerful as the parties
permit her to be.
Jared S. Gross
92 ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 551 (1976).
93 See supra text accompanying note I.
94 Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581.
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